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Abstract This paper analyzes the uniformity of the property appraisal
outcome for multifamily apartment complexes in Phoenix,
Arizona. Speciﬁcally, it investigates vertical and horizontal
equity and equity across assessment methods. Apartment
transactions and assessed valuations are examined over a ﬁve-
year period (1998–2002). Once possible bias in model
speciﬁcation is accounted for, no evidence of vertical inequity in
the sample is found. However, there is modest evidence of
horizontal inequity: the results suggest that complex size and
geographic location are more difﬁcult for the assessor to value
uniformly. There is also inequity between small and large
properties, as represented by two different valuation methods.
Thus, the ﬁndings indicate that the income approach is superior
to the sales comparison approach for valuing multifamily
properties for tax purposes.
Introduction
The property tax in the United States suffers from an assortment of administrative,
economic and political conﬂicts. These conﬂicts arise for four principle reasons.
First, the property tax is a signiﬁcant cost of owning real property. Mills (1980)
shows that a 2% property tax, based on the asset value of structures and land, is
comparable to a 20% annual sales tax. Second, unlike most business taxes, few
legal paths exist to sidestep the property tax, leaving few degrees of freedom for
tax planners (McLure, 2002). Third, the property tax is a direct tax, but the public
beneﬁts received from the tax are often indirect (Palmon and Smith, 1998). Fourth,
the public is suspect about the uniformity of the tax (Fisher, 1996). Perhaps
the high burden on property owners, the inability to avoid the tax, the
misunderstanding of the beneﬁts received from the tax, and concerns about its
uniformity partially explain why voters and legislative bodies have tried to limit
the property tax by imposing constraints on appraisals, rates, or revenue growth
(Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1995). Despite these
perceived problems, the property tax remains a major source of revenue for school18  Cornia and Slade
districts and local governments in the U.S. (Bruce, 2000). Over thirty-ﬁve years
ago, Netzer (1966) noted that Americans disliked the property tax but used it
heavily. He labeled this conﬂict the property tax paradox. This paradox continues
today.
Surprisingly, specialists in public ﬁnance see advantages to a property tax because
it provides ﬁscal and political autonomy for local governments. In a survey of
1,309 Canadian and U.S. members of the National Tax Association, 93% with
training in economics recommended continued use of the property tax as a major
source of revenue for local governments (Slemrod, 1995). The property tax
provides the potential for increased economic efﬁciency, because the property tax
establishes a ‘‘tax price’’ that taxpayers can react to (Oates, 1996). Further, if a
property tax is designed and administered correctly, it may provide incentives for
the optimal use of land (Brueckner, 1986; and Tideman, Akobundo, Johns and
Wutthicharoen, 2002). However, this last advantage highlights the complaints that
professionals have with the property tax. If it is not administered properly, the
advantage of the property tax is lost, and it may distort land use and create excess
burden, especially for mobile capital.
The concern over administration centers on the problem of consistently measuring
the annual taxable value or base of individual properties. The starting point for
other taxes is based on a ﬂow of value that allows administrators to examine actual
economic events—sales or income transactions—to establish the taxable value of
the base. The property tax requires a taxable value to be set on a speciﬁc date,
but few properties sell in any given year, and property tax administrators are left
to create hypothetical transactions—what would this property sell for in the open
market if it did sell?—to establish the tax base.
The process of estimating the value of an asset that trades infrequently is under
continual academic and professional debate. However, many recognize that the
process can be quite subjective. Hyman (1998) describes the practice of property
assessment by public assessors as an ‘‘art,’’ not a science. Kay (1990) suggests
that when estimates are used to value a tax base, the possibility of being incorrect
is so high that hypothetically determined tax bases may not survive in a global
economy where capital is mobile. Concerns about the uniformity of the property
tax have been articulated in the literature and the results conﬁrm the belief that
the property tax often suffers from inconsistent valuations.
Virtually all the research on the uniformity of the property tax has examined
single-family residential homes. In this article, the same methodologies are used
to examine equity in the valuation of residential homes to multifamily housing
facilities. An important contribution of this paper is to extend an analysis of
property tax valuation to other classes of property. Allen (2003), in a carefully
designed study, examines the issue of vertical equity of multifamily homes during
a one-year period in Broward County, Florida. The study discussed here extends
his study in several important areas: (1) the vertical equity of the property tax is
examined over a ﬁve-year period; (2) horizontal equity in multifamily housing isProperty Taxation of Multifamily Housing  19
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investigated; and (3) equity across assessment methods is examined.1 The data
used in this study come from the sales of multifamily housing units that occurred
over a ﬁve-year period in the metropolitan Phoenix, Arizona area (Maricopa
County). Unlike most previous studies, this data allows for an investigation of the
intertemporal uniformity of the property tax. Generally, equity in property taxation
is perceived to exist if there is both vertical and horizontal equity within the tax
jurisdiction. Vertical equity results when the assessment ratio (AV/MV)—the ratio
of assessed value to market value—is uniform across property value ranges.
Horizontal equity results when the assessment ratio is uniform across properties
with similar market values. Note: the Maricopa County Assessor’s Ofﬁce uses two
different appraisal methods depending on the size of the apartment property.
Speciﬁcally, a hedonic regression sales comparison approach is used for apartment
properties with fewer than thirteen units, and a hedonic regression income
approach is used for properties with more than twelve units. This also allows for
an examination of equity across assessment methods.
This paper proceeds as follows: The second section brieﬂy reviews the magnitude
of multifamily housing units in America and offers some sense of the
socioeconomic makeup of apartment dwellers. This section also examines the
implications of who actually faces the burden or the incidence of the property
tax—the owner of the property or the renter? In the third section, there is a
discussion of the unique way that multifamily housing units are valued for
property tax purposes in Maricopa County, Arizona and a review of the
characteristics of the dataset. In the fourth section, there is a review of both the
methodologies that examine vertical and horizontal equity. The ﬁfth section
reviews the empirical results. The sixth section presents an investigation of equity
across assessment methods. The ﬁnal section is the conclusion with policy
observations for public assessors, owners of multifamily housing units and elected
policy makers.
 Multifamily Housing in the United States
Relative to single-family housing, multifamily housing receives modest attention
from policy makers. In the U.S., this may be to the detriment of millions of
households.2 Individuals and families who live in rental property represent about
34 million housing units, or about one-third of the population of the U.S. About
one-half of the rental units are provided by multifamily complexes—ﬁve or more
units per building (Schnare, 2001). Thus, about 16.7 million components of the
housing stock in the U.S. are of a multifamily nature. The percentage of renters
is invariably higher in urban areas than in suburban and rural areas. In some urban
areas renters outnumber homeowners. In Los Angeles and New York, over 60%
of the housing comes from rental units. In Dallas, Chicago, Houston and San
Diego, rental housing provides at least 50% of the total housing stock. In Phoenix,
rental housing constitutes about 32% of the total housing.
In addition to the urban nature of multifamily housing, a variety of other
socioeconomic markers distinguish renters in the U.S. Compared to homeowners,20  Cornia and Slade
a higher percentage of renters are poor, single-parent families; come from ethnic
and racial groups; and have lower median income levels (Census Bureau, 2001).
Because such statistical indicators suggest an economic hurdle must be crossed
before an individual or family becomes a homeowner, one might assume that a
primary reason to examine the equity of the property tax on multifamily housing
is because inequities are passed forward to renters, and renters are often
synonymous with poverty. There are of course millions of individuals and families
who have the option to live in single-family residential dwellings but choose to
live in apartments. Nevertheless, the assumption about poverty and renters is made
in a variety of studies on the incidence of the property tax on renters (Chernick
and Reschovsky, 1990). It is also the assumption made in the states that grant
property tax relief to both homeowners and renters, and is the reason that states
that do not have this practice are criticized in the literature (Krueckeberg, 1999).
The assertion that renters pay the property tax however is built on debatable
assumptions. Without spiraling into a full discussion on the economic incidence
of the property tax, note one contrasting view on this issue. One group of scholars
argues that the application of a property tax on economic factors results in the
incidence of the tax being placed on the immobile economic factors. This suggests
that because renters are mobile, they can avoid a substantial share of the property
tax; it is the property owners who face most of the burden of the tax. In other
words, if a landlord attempts to raise the rent because of the property tax, renters
will consider their options and simply move or they ‘‘vote with their feet.’’ Under
this view the property tax is a tax on capital and ultimately the owners of capital
(Zodrow, 1986). However, as Mills and Lubuele (1997) note, few believe that the
concentration of poor people in the inner city is ‘‘entirely voluntary,’’ and thus
the assumption of mobility of the urban rental population faces some policy
discount.
In short, this prior research suggests that improperly imposed property taxes may
distort investment and cause inefﬁcient decisions in the rental housing market.
 Empirical Data and Maricopa County Assessment
Practices
The data used in this study consist of apartment transactions that occurred in
Maricopa County, Arizona, from 1998 through 2002. The data set includes 946
transactions researched by the CoStar Group, Inc.3 CoStar investigates apartment
transactions exceeding $250,000 by physically inspecting each property and
conﬁrming the particulars of the transaction with the relevant parties, including
buyer, seller and broker. CoStar also reports their evaluation of the overall
condition or quality of each property. In addition, representatives of CoStar obtain
the assessed value of the property at the time of sale, as reported by the Maricopa
County Assessor.
To determine the assessed value of apartment properties, the County Assessor’s
ofﬁce employs a mass appraisal process that uses a hedonic regression model toProperty Taxation of Multifamily Housing  21
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estimate the value of apartment properties. For the period of study, the County
Assessor was revaluing property on an annual basis, although a lag of
approximately eighteen months existed between the tax notice date and the age
of the transaction and rental data used to estimate value. More recently, the
Assessor has moved to a two-year rotation schedule.4 Besides the frequency of
reappraisal, several unique aspects of the approaches are used in Maricopa County
to value apartment buildings. Using a hedonic model to value residential properties
is common; however, using a hedonic model to estimate value for a multifamily
property is less common.5 For smaller properties, those with fewer than thirteen
units, the hedonic regression model incorporates independent variables that reﬂect
physical, location and transaction-related attributes, while the dependent variable
is the sales price.
For larger properties, those with more than thirteen units, the Assessor uses
independent variables similar to the ones used for smaller facilities, but uses rental
income as the dependent variable. The contemporary rental data of apartment
properties in Maricopa County is obtained from a nongovernmental data provider.
Using rental income as the dependent variable allows the Assessor to estimate the
potential gross income for each property. Again this is a unique approach that
allows mass appraisal of multifamily housing.6 At least one International
Association of Assessing Ofﬁcers (IAAO) text makes mention of estimating the
value of apartment buildings based on income; however, this method is rarely
used (Gloudemans, 1999). Smith and Islam (1998) report limited applications of
this approach in the applied appraisal literature; Isakson (2001) notes that this
approach has been used on speciﬁc properties during appraisal appeals. Because
property taxes in the U.S. are based on capital value, one additional step is needed
to transform rental income into capital value by applying a gross income multiplier
to the estimated rent. A hedonic regression model is also used to estimate a gross
income multiplier for each property. When the estimated gross income multiplier
is applied to the estimated potential gross income, a capital value estimate is
generated for each property.7
Arizona property tax law requires that the assessor estimate an assessed value that
reﬂects full cash, or market value [Arizona Revised Statutes: 42-11054(B)]. As is
common in many states, a legislative modiﬁcation allows county assessors to
adjust the full cash value estimate by a factor of 0.82. This allowance is intended
to reduce the assessed value for mass appraisal error, time to sell property,
ﬁnancing costs and personal property. One other likely effect of this policy is to
provide the assessor and the assessment process with a ‘‘cushion of error.’’
Goolsby (1997) and Allen and Dare (2002) suggest that assessing ofﬁcials often
underassess properties to minimize tax appeals; however, property tax equity can
be maintained as long as all properties in a jurisdiction have a uniform assessment
ratio.8
Exhibit 1 reports summary statistics on the continuous variables. The mean sales
price is approximately $3.2 million; however, the minimum and maximum of
$250,000 and $54,000,000, respectively, illustrate the large variation in property22  Cornia and Slade
Exhibit 1  Descriptive Statistics
Phoenix Apartment Transactions (1998–2002)
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Sales Price 3,214,500 6,375,500 250,000 54,000,000
Assessed Value 2,291,900 4,669,500 80,000 42,152,500
Number of Units 69 103 5 768
Building Age (Yrs.) 27.96 13.30 1.0 109.0
Note: Values are for all properties; 946 total observations.




Better than average 0.079 75
Average 0.752 712
Worse than average 0.168 159
Geographic Areas
Central Phoenix 0.653 618
Tempe 0.062 59
East Valley 0.128 122
North & West Cites 0.084 79







values. The typical transaction is for a complex with sixty-nine units and a mean
building age of twenty-eight years (standard deviation of thirteen years). The mean
assessed value is approximately $2.3 million or about 29% lower than the mean
sales price.
Exhibit 2 presents the frequency of the binary variables and reports that nearly
75% of the complexes are in ‘‘average’’ condition, whereas only 8% were
considered better than average and 17% worse than average. The Central PhoenixProperty Taxation of Multifamily Housing  23
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Exhibit 3  Appraisal Method
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: Smaller Properties (Fewer than 13 Units; 217 Observations)
Sales Price 348,631 80,050 250,000 632,500
Assessed Value 237,073 75,117 80,096 492,500
Panel B: Larger Properties (More than 12 Units; 729 Observations)
Sales Price 4,067,514 7,041,585 252,200 54,000,000
Assessed Value 2,903,541 5,164,187 122,766 42,152,500
area dominates the sample with 65% of the transactions. The East Valley is second
with about 13%. North and West Cities, Scottsdale/Cave Creek and Tempe are
close third, fourth and ﬁfth, with 8%, 7% and 6%, respectively. The transactions
are smoothly distributed across time, with transactions ranging from 178 to 200
in each year.
Panels A and B in Exhibit 3 separate the data by appraisal method. Panel A
includes 217 transactions of smaller properties (fewer than thirteen units)
composing 23% of the data set. For these smaller properties, the assessed value
was obtained by using a mass appraisal hedonic regression sales comparison
approach. The mean assessed value of $237,000 is approximately 32% lower than
the mean sales price of the sample. Panel B includes 729 transactions of larger
properties (more than thirteen units), composing 77% of the sample. A mass
appraisal hedonic regression income approach is used to estimate the assessed
value for each of these properties. The mean assessed value of $2,903,000 is
approximately 29% lower than the mean sales price. The statistics for the entire
sample, Exhibit 1, are similar to Panel B because of the signiﬁcant weight of the
larger properties in the complete sample. Two preliminary observations result from
the descriptive statistics of Exhibits 1 and 3. First, it is evident that the legislative
intent to reduce the assessed values of apartment properties in Maricopa County
is working. The assessed values are signiﬁcantly lower than the respective sales
prices. Second, the slightly larger spread between assessed values and sales prices
for smaller properties may suggest that the mass appraisal sales comparison
approach is less robust compared to the income approach for estimating the
assessed value of apartment properties.
Exhibit 4 provides the mean sales price and assessed value for all properties for
each of the ﬁve years. This exhibit shows that the mean sales price increased in
each year of the ﬁrst fours years; however, a noticeable decline is evident in the
ﬁfth year, 2002. In addition, the spread between the assessed value and the sales

















Exhibit 4  All Properties (Yearly Data)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Sales Price (Mean) 2,474,682 2,893,361 3,763,137 3,915,966 2,972,216
Assessed Value (Mean) 1,820,217 2,021,673 2,879,510 2,813,805 1,903,969
AV % Difference from SP 26.45% 30.13% 23.48% 28.15% 35.94%
Number of Observations 178 190 182 200 196
Note: The data were obtained from the CoStar Group, Inc. (formerly Comps InfoSystems, Inc.). Employees at the CoStar Group physically inspect each
property and conﬁrm transaction details with relevant parties. The Maricopa County Assessor’s Ofﬁce uses a sales comparison approach to estimate the
assessed value of all apartments with fewer than 13 units, and a hedonic income approach to estimate the assessed value of apartments with more than 12
units.Property Taxation of Multifamily Housing  25
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Note: Berndt (1991) provides an index construction technique that allows for a better understanding of the
intertemporal change in sales prices (assessed values). First, a log linear model is employed that regresses sales
price (assessed value) on a vector of property characteristic and yearly binary time variables. Second, the index
is constructed by taking the antilogarithms of the time variables and normalizing to unity. This process holds property
characteristics constant, allowing for a clear indication of the intertemporal trend in sales price (assessed value).
compare the intertemporal nature of sales prices (assessed values) has inherent
problems. Speciﬁcally, change in prices (assessed values) may either result from
true price (assessed value) changes or from the quality differences in transacting
properties from one sample period to another. Constant quality hedonic indices
rectify this problem. Speciﬁcally, the natural log of sales prices (assessed values)
is regressed on a vector of independent property characteristic and annual binary
time variables. The index is constructed by taking the antilogarithms of the
coefﬁcients from the time variables and normalizing to unity. This process holds
property characteristics constant, allowing for a clear indication of the
intertemporal trend in sales price (assessed value) (Berndt, 1991). Using the data
and variables from Exhibits 1–4 in the regression analysis, constant quality indices
are generated for both sales price and assessed value. The results from this analysis
are illustrated in Exhibit 5.
Assessed values have experienced only a moderate increase of about 3%–5% over
the entire ﬁve-year period; however, apartment prices have increased by over 30%
during the same period. It is clear that assessed values have not kept pace with
this robust market, because the difference in assessed values and sales prices
increases in each year of the study.26  Cornia and Slade
 Examination of Vertical and Horizontal Equity
Two standards of equity are used to monitor the performance of the property tax.9
The ﬁrst standard is vertical equity, present when the AV/SP ratio is uniform over
differing price ranges of the same type of property (Sirmans, Diskin and Friday,
1995). When analysts discover that low-value properties are assessed at a ratio
that is higher (lower) than that of higher valued properties, they label the outcome
as regressive (progressive) taxation. The second standard is horizontal equity and
is based on the public ﬁnance concept of equal treatment of equals (Atkinson and
Stiglitz 1980; and Musgrave, 1990). In the case of the property tax, this means
that properties with similar market value are treated uniformly or are appraised at
the same percentage of market value (IAAO 1978; and Allen and Dare, 2002).
Vertical Equity Tests
The measures used to determine vertical equity began with straightforward
comparisons of the AV/SPratios between properties controlling for type and value
(Oldman and Arron, 1965). Use of this simple comparison has continued in some
studies primarily because of the ease at which analysts can explain their results
to the general public and elected policy makers (Pearson, 1979). Subsequent work
measuring vertical equity has leveraged off variations of the Paglin and Fogarty
(1972) model, namely AV  ao  a1SP, where ao and a1 are regression
coefﬁcients.10 Cheng (1974) recommends using the log of AV and SP to account
for nonlinear relationships and to provide for the interpretation of the coefﬁcients
as elasticities. The IAAO (1978) posits that the appropriate measure of vertical
equity is the AV/SP ratio regressed on sales price. This functional form allows for
an intuitive explanation: vertical equity exists if there is no correlation between
the AV/SPratio and sales price. Kochin and Parks (1982) suggest that these former
models are biased toward regressivity due to an ‘‘errors in variables’’ problem
because sales price is used as a proxy for market value. Kochin and Parks propose
that logging and reversing the dependent and independent variables (ln SP  ao
 a1 ln AV) will correct the problem. Bell (1984) argues that the Kochin and
Parks model is ﬂawed because it assumes market error but does not allow for
subjective assessment error. He defends the traditional approach, but shows that
nonlinear inequity is better captured by including a quadratic term (AV  ao 
a1SP  a2SP2).
Clapp (1990) argues that the Bell (1984) model will be biased toward regressivity
and the Kochin and Parks (1982) model will be biased toward progressivity. Clapp
(1990) recognizes that market value and assessed value are interdependent because
taxes are capitalized negatively into market value; and he proposes a simultaneous
equations model to address this issue. Speciﬁcally, he introduces an instrumental
variable that accounts for the high correlation between market value and assessed
value but is uncorrelated with the error terms in the Kochin and Parks model.Property Taxation of Multifamily Housing  27
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Birch, Sunderman and Hamilton (1990) and Sunderman, Birch, Cannaday and
Hamilton (1990) show that under some situations the relationship between AV and
SP may be S-shaped, and have recommended the use of spline regression models.
They base their arguments on the observation that improvements to properties are
valued using a cost approach and that the cost approach does not respond well to
determining land values or accurately calculating depreciation on high- or low-
value properties.11
Sirmans, Diskin and Friday (1995) and Smith (2000) examine vertical equity in
single-family residences by effectively employing all of the above models in their
analysis; however, their results are inconclusive regarding the ‘‘best’’ model.
Sirmans et al. do, however, suggest that the Clapp (1990) model provides an
effective alternative to the problems encountered with many of the previous
models. Benson and Schwartz (1997) reject the models that assume sales price is
a function of assessed value by arguing that it is difﬁcult to defend the notion that
government ofﬁcials are better at developing estimates of value than the market.
This latter argument has merit; however, only the Clapp (1990) model explicitly
recognizes that assessed value feeds back into market value; therefore, a
simultaneous equations approach might provide more reliable results. After
considering the merits of each technique, four models were selected for the
following reasons. First, the IAAO (1978) model is used because of its widespread
use and direct interpretation of the results. Second, the Cheng (1974) and Bell
(1984) models are used that allow for nonlinearity between AV and SP and provide
intuitive interpretation. Third, the Clapp (1990) model is used because there is
convincing evidence that assessed value feeds back on sales price, causing an
‘‘errors in variables’’problem. Each of these models, as well as related hypotheses,
is outlined below:
AV
IAAO (1978):  a  aS P . (1) 01 SP
The null hypothesis is Hoa1  0. The IAAO model offers an intuitive
interpretation. If the AV/SP ratio is correlated with sales prices, then vertical
inequity exists. This correlation is manifest in the coefﬁcient. A negative (positive)
coefﬁcient suggests a negative (positive) relationship between AV/SP and sale
price, consistent with regressive (progressive) vertical inequity.
Cheng (1974): ln AV  a  a ln SP. (2) 01
The null hypothesis is Hoa1  1. Vertical equity exists if the coefﬁcient a1 is
equal to one; however, if the coefﬁcient is less (greater) than one, regressive
(progressive) property tax inequity is evident.28  Cornia and Slade
2 Bell (1984): AV  a  aS P aS P. (3) 01 2
This model explicitly accounts for the nonlinearity in AV/SP. The null hypothesis
for vertical equity is a0  a2  0; therefore, the variables of interest are the
intercept term and the coefﬁcient for the quadratic term. If the quadratic term is
insigniﬁcant, then a linear model is satisfactory and regressive (progressive)
inequity is evident with a positive (negative) and signiﬁcant intercept term. If the
quadratic and intercept terms are positive and negative respectively, then
progressive inequity exists at an accelerating rate. If the quadratic and intercept
terms are positive, then offsetting progressivity exists. If the quadratic and
intercept terms are negative, then offsetting regressivity exists. If the quadratic
and intercept terms are negative and positive respectively, then regressive inequity
exists at an accelerating rate. If neither the quadratic term nor the intercept terms
are signiﬁcant, then no inequity exists.
Clapp (1990): ln SP  a  a ln AV, 01
where ln AV     ln Z (4) o 1
Z is an instrumental variable deﬁned as follows: Z  1i fAV and SP rank in
the bottom one third of the data; Z  1i fAV and SP rank in the top one third
of the data; and Z  0 otherwise. The null hypothesis is Hoa1  1. Vertical equity
exists if the coefﬁcient a1 is equal to one; however, if the coefﬁcient is greater
(less) than one, regressive (progressive) property tax inequity is evident.
In addition to the parametric models, a nonparametric technique is used to examine
vertical equity: the Spearman Rank test. This test examines the correlation between
the rank order of the AV/SP ratio and sales price. The null hypothesis for this test
assumes no correlation between the AV/SP ratio and the sales price. A signiﬁcant
negative (positive) correlation suggests a regressive (progressive) property tax
inequity.12
Vertical Equity Empirical Results
The ﬁrst stage of the investigation examines assessment ratios (AV/SP) over
different price ranges and year of sale. Exhibit 6 provides the results of these
calculations.
The sales price levels were derived by arraying the data by sales price in ascending
order and then separating the data into ﬁve quintiles, resulting in approximately




























































Exhibit 6  Assessment Ratios (AV/SP) by Year of Sale and Sales Price Range
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 All
Level Sales Price Range n A V/SP n A V/SP n A V/SP n A V/SP n A V/SP n A V/SP
1 250,000–384,000 41 0.86 38 0.84 36 0.70 49 0.65 25 0.55 189 0.73
2 385,000–637,250 40 0.91 50 0.76 35 0.70 30 0.74 34 0.61 189 0.75
3 640,000–1,230,000 40 0.80 29 0.70 41 0.71 41 0.66 39 0.65 190 0.70
4 1,235,000–3,625,000 26 0.71 34 0.71 34 0.70 33 0.70 62 0.62 189 0.68
5 3,644,000–54,000,000 31 0.73 39 0.72 36 0.76 47 0.73 36 0.66 189 0.72
Total/Average 178 0.80 220 0.75 182 0.71 200 0.70 196 0.62 946 0.7230  Cornia and Slade
early years, 1998 and 1999, the ratios generally declined as the sales price
increased; suggesting regressive vertical inequity. This trend is reversed, the ratios
increasing slightly with sales price in 2000 through 2002, suggesting a slight
progressive vertical inequity during these periods. When all years are combined
and the ratios are examined over the ﬁve price ranges, there is a hint of
regressivity. A very interesting ﬁnding is the monotonic decline in the average
ratio from 1998 through 2002 of 0.80 to 0.62. This is a material decline over a
ﬁve-year period. There are two possible explanations for this ﬁnding: ﬁrst, the
assessor may have systematically decreased the assessed valuations with respect
to market value, or second and more likely as observed in Exhibit 5, the market
values have been increasing leaving the assessed values behind.
The regression results from the IAAO (1978) model are provided in Panel A of
Exhibit 7. In this model the AV/SP ratio is regressed on sales price (SP). The a1
coefﬁcient for years 1998 and 1999 is negative and statistically signiﬁcant,
suggesting regressive vertical inequity. For the remaining years, the coefﬁcient is
positive; however, only year 2000 is statistically signiﬁcant.
Panel B in Exhibit 7 provides the regression results from the Cheng (1974) model
on each year of data. For years 1998 and 1999, the coefﬁcient a1 is less than one
and is statistically signiﬁcant, conﬁrming a pattern of regressive valuation in these
years. For the remaining years, the a1 coefﬁcient is positive, suggesting progressive
vertical inequity; however, only year 2001 is statistically signiﬁcant. These results
are consistent with the ﬁndings in Exhibit 6.
The results from the Bell (1984) model are provided in Panel C of Exhibit 7. The
coefﬁcient on the a2 variable is positive and signiﬁcant in 1998, suggesting
progressive inequity; however, all subsequent years exhibit signiﬁcant regressive
inequity. This result is consistent with the expectation of Clapp (1990) who claims
the Bell model is biased toward regressivity due to the feedback problem between
assessed value and sales price. After correcting for this problem by using a
simultaneous equations technique, the Clapp (1990) model ﬁnds no signiﬁcant
evidence of vertical inequity (see Panel D of Exhibit 7). Although not signiﬁcant,
the a1 coefﬁcients for each year are consistent with the IAAO and Cheng models.
After examining the individual years, the results of each model were estimated
over the entire ﬁve years by including binary variables for 1999 through 2002,
the omitted variable being 1998. The results of this analysis are provided in
Exhibit 8. The results are consistent with expectation: speciﬁcally, in the yearly
analysis there is evidence of both regressive and progressive vertical inequity in
the IAAO and Cheng models. However, taken together, the effects are offsetting
suggesting that in the aggregate there is no signiﬁcant vertical inequity (a1 is not
signiﬁcant). For the Bell (1984) model, regressive vertical inequity is found in
four of the ﬁve years, therefore, regressive inequity is found when all years are
examined together (a2 is signiﬁcant). After correcting for the errors in variables
problem, the Clapp (1990) model ﬁnds no inequity when considering the ﬁve years
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Exhibit 7  Vertical Equity Analysis
Year of Sale a0 t-Stat a1 t-Stat Adj. R2
Panel A: AV /SP  ao  a1SP (IAAO, 1978)
1998 0.8342 38.54 9.257E-9 2.20* 0.0212
1999 0.7625 55.02 5.054E-9 2.20* 0.0200
2000 0.7003 51.30 3.321E-9 2.09* 0.0182
2001 0.6855 43.45 1.701E-9 0.94 0.0006
2002 0.6151 48.00 1.862E-9 0.93 0.0007
Panel B: lnAV  ao  a1lnSP (Cheng, 1974)
Year of Sale a0 t-Stat a1 t-Stat Adj. R2
1998 0.7216 2.55 0.9288 3.48* 0.9213
1999 0.2300 1.19 0.9607 2.84* 0.9621
2000 0.7324 3.36 1.0257 1.67 0.9606
2001 0.8175 4.28 1.0295 2.17* 0.9667
2002 0.8641 3.27 1.0248 1.33 0.9394
Panel C: AV  ao  a1SP  a2SP2 (Bell, 1984)
Year of Sale a0 t-Stat a1 t-Stat a2 t-Stat R2
1998 102080 1.40 0.6600 20.56 3.21E-9 2.12* 0.9486
1999 209058 2.34* 0.9274 27.44 1.24E-8 9.33* 0.9284
2000 241092 1.79 0.8944 21.85 3.33E-9 2.88* 0.9449
2001 79039 0.61 0.7863 23.74 2.44E-9 2.89* 0.9300
2002 247499 3.21* 0.8040 32.70 5.84E-9 8.32* 0.9474
Panel D: lnSP  ao  a1lnAV where lnAV  bo b1lnZ (Clapp, 1990)
Year of Sale a0 t-Stat a1 t-Stat Adj. R2
1998 0.1472 0.22 1.0301 0.61 0.7140
1999 0.0690 0.12 1.0284 0.68 0.7663
2000 0.8682 1.48 0.9636 0.85 0.7387
2001 1.0737 2.15 0.9508 1.35 0.7749
2002 1.2129 2.51 0.9486 1.45 0.7861
Notes: In Panel A, if the coefﬁcient b1 is 0, there is no vertical property tax inequity. If the
coefﬁcient is less (greater) than zero, there is regressive (progressive) property tax inequity.
In Panel B, if a1 is equal to one, no vertical tax inequity exists; however, a coefﬁcient less (greater)
than one indicates a regressive (progressive) property tax inequity. The null hypothesis for the
t-Statistic is HOa1  1.32  Cornia and Slade
Exhibit 7  (continued)
Vertical Equity Analysis
In Panel C, if the quadratic term is insigniﬁcant then a linear model is satisfactory and a
regressive (progressive) inequity is evident with a positive (negative) and signiﬁcant intercept term.
If the quadratic and intercept terms are positive and negative respectively then progressive inequity
exists at an accelerating rate. If the quadratic and intercept terms are positive then offsetting
progressivity exists. If the quadratic and intercept terms are negative then offsetting regressivity
exists. If the quadratic and intercept terms are negative and positive respectively then regressive
inequity exists at an accelerating rate. If neither the quadratic term nor the intercept terms are
signiﬁcant then no inequity exists. The null hypothesis for vertical equity is a0  a2  0.
In Panel D, if a1 is equal to one, no vertical tax inequity exists; however, a coefﬁcient less (greater)
than one indicates a progressive (regressive) property tax inequity. The null hypothesis for the
t-Statistic is HOa1  1
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
Exhibit 8  Models with Time Variables
Variable
A V/SP  a0
 a1SP  time
(IAAO, 1978)
lnAV  a0
 a1lnSP  time
(Cheng, 1974)
AV  a0  a1SP
 a2SP2  time
(Bell, 1984)
lnSP  a0
 a1lnAV  time
(Clapp, 1990)
a0 0.8107 0.2192 69465 0.5126
(55.39) (2.11) (0.71) (2.06)
a1 2.04E-10 0.9969 0.7951 0.9822
(0.02) (0.41) (52.49) (0.98)
a2 —— 2.95E-9 —
—— ( 6.68*) —
1999 0.0635 0.0567 101606 0.0721
(3.16) (1.92) (0.78) (1.12)
2000 0.0987 0.1095 173961 0.1039
(4.85) (3.66) (1.32) (1.60)
2001 0.1193 0.1421 5837 0.2072
(6.00) (4.86) (0.05) (3.26)
2002 0.1908 0.2526 269341 0.1356
(9.57) (8.59) (2.08) (2.12)
Adjusted R2 0.0914 0.9512 0.9283 0.7597
Note: The Clapp model includes the instrumental variable computation for lnAV. Values in
parentheses are t-Stats. The number of observations for all models is 946.
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Exhibit 9  Spearman Rank Nonparametric Test








*Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
As another analysis of vertical equity, the Spearman Rank nonparametric test was
conducted. The null hypothesis assumes no correlation between the assessment
ratio (AV/SP) and the sales price. As provided in Exhibit 9, the Spearman Rank
Correlation coefﬁcients for 1998 and 1999 are 0.266 and 0.213 respectively,
while for 2000 through 2002 the coefﬁcients are 0.097, 0.208 and 0.182
respectively. All the coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. These ﬁndings
are most similar to those provided by the Cheng model, but are also consistent
with the IAAO model, namely that regressive vertical inequity is evident in the
early years of the sample and that progressive vertical inequity is found but is
more modest in the latter years. The Spearman Rank test ﬁnds no vertical inequity
over the ﬁve years collectively.
To conclude, the results from the Bell model appear to be biased toward
regressivity as expected; therefore, little weight is given to these results. The
results from the IAAO, Cheng and nonparametric Spearman Rank test suggest
regressive inequity is evident in the early years, with a shift towards progressive
vertical inequity in the latter years. All of these former models however suffer
from the feedback problem noted by Clapp (1990). After correcting for this
problem, there is no signiﬁcant evidence of vertical inequity. In addition, when
all models were examined over the entire ﬁve years, only the Bell model ﬁnds
evidence of vertical inequity. In summary, there is a hint of vertical inequity in
some years (speciﬁcally regressive inequity); however, the overall analysis ﬁnds
no signiﬁcant vertical inequity in the Maricopa County apartment market.
Horizontal Equity Tests
In this case of horizontal equity in multifamily housing, the distinction is not
based on equity across a value range, but equity within a value range. In other
words, properties with similar value should be treated uniformly or appraised at34  Cornia and Slade
the same percentage of market value (IAAO, 1978; and Allen and Dare, 2002).
Relevant studies of horizontal equity in ad valorem property taxation include Berry
and Bednarz (1975), Haurin (1988), Goolsby (1997) and Allen and Dare (2002)
who examine single-family residential properties; DeCesare and Ruddock (1998)
who examine apartments in Brazil; and Kowalski and Colwell (1986) who
examine industrial properties. After reviewing the tests of horizontal equity in the
prior studies, the methodologies used by Berry and Bednarz and Goolsby, as well
as Allen and Dare (2002), are considered most applicable for the data in this
study. Berry and Bednarz regress the (AV/SP) ratio on a vector of independent
property characteristic and location variables. Goolsby adds a log linear
speciﬁcation to the model as follows:
AV
ln  a  a ln(X)  e, (5)  0 i SP
where X is a vector of independent property characteristic and location variables
and ai is a vector of coefﬁcients to be estimated. For horizontal equity, the null
hypothesis is Hoai  0, suggesting that for properties of similar value, no property
characteristic or location variable has signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the assessment ratio.
A signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on an independent variable infers horizontal inequity. For
instance, if a geographic binary variable is positive (negative) and signiﬁcant, then
the assessment ratio is higher (lower) for properties in that geographic area
compared with similar valued properties in other geographic areas, thus leading
to inequity for these properties.
Allen and Dare (2002) propose an alternative method for measuring horizontal
inequity as follows:
(AV/MV)  (AV/MV)  (X)  e, (6) i




characteristic and location variables that may be related to inequity, and  is a
vector of coefﬁcients to be estimated. The absolute value of the difference between
the property’s assessment ratio and the mean assessment ratio for the n properties
is a measure of an individual property’s horizontal inequity. The coefﬁcients in
the regression provide insight into the determinants of horizontal inequity for the
sample data. For example, a positive (negative) and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on a
continuous independent variable suggests that an increase in the variable leads to
an increase (decrease) in the absolute value of horizontal inequity.Property Taxation of Multifamily Housing  35
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Exhibit 10  Horizontal Equity Analysis
Variable Price L1 Price L2 Price L3 Price L4 Price L5
Panel A: (ln(AV /SP)i  ln(X)  e (Berry & Bednarz, 1975; Goolsby, 1997)
Ln Units 0.2301* 0.3392* 0.1895* 0.0651 0.0356
(3.22) (6.13) (3.06) (1.03) (0.87)
Ln Age 0.1507* 0.0208 0.0114 0.0118 0.0044
(3.14) (0.50) (0.25) (0.17) (0.14)
Better Cond. — — 0.4184 0.0231 0.0608
— — (1.62) (0.11) (1.05)
Worse Cond. 0.0617 0.0645 0.0015 0.0068 0.2205
(1.63) (1.39) (0.03) (0.07) (1.58)
Tempe 0.0480 0.0332 0.0591 0.0618 0.0791
(0.56) (0.25) (0.74) (0.74) (1.07)
East Valley 0.2402 0.2045* 0.0601 0.0930 0.1173*
(0.43) (3.08) (0.98) (1.16) (1.98)
NW Cities 0.0071 0.0740 0.0179 0.0702 0.1220
(0.09) (0.97) (0.27) (0.88) (1.74)
Scottsdale/CC 0.2186* 0.0216 0.2310* 0.2423 0.0653
(3.16) (0.30) (2.32) (1.46) (1.04)
Year 1999 0.0165 0.1867* 0.0986 0.0635 0.0298
(0.29) (3.18) (1.58) (0.75) (0.44)
Year 2000 0.1649* 0.2223* 0.0974 0.0234 0.0618
(2.91) (3.52) (1.68) (0.28) (0.89)
Year 2001 0.2085* 0.1869* 0.1607* 0.0567 0.0120
(3.85) (2.86) (2.78) (0.63) (0.18)
Year 2002 0.3480* 0.3014* 0.1718* 0.0916 0.1371*
(5.23) (4.53) (2.90) (1.12) (2.00)
Constant 0.2645 1.1694* 0.9433* 0.7442* 0.2138
(1.17) (5.82) (3.53) (2.01) (0.81)
Adj. R2 0.342 0.284 0.088 0.012 0.047
Horizontal Equity Empirical Results
The two models identiﬁed above are applied to the ﬁve price level quintiles in
Exhibit 6 so as to ensure that properties of similar value are analyzed as required
by the deﬁnition of horizontal equity. The results of this analysis are shown in
Exhibit 10.
Panel A in Exhibit 10 illustrates the results from the Berry and Bednarz (1975)
and Goolsby (1997) models. Horizontal inequity is evidenced in price levels 1, 2,36  Cornia and Slade
Exhibit 10  (continued)
Horizontal Equity Analysis
Variable Price L1 Price L2 Price L3 Price L4 Price L5
Panel B:  (X)  e (Allen & Dare, 2002) (AV/SP)  (AV/SP) i
Units 0.0054 0.0112* 0.0002 0.0005 0.0001*
(1.51) (5.11) (0.18) (1.37) (2.06)
Age 0.0007 0.0003 0.0010 0.0015 0.0028*
(0.86) (0.30) (1.51) (1.54) (2.37)
Better Cond. — — 0.1370 0.1153 0.0161
— — (1.27) (1.67) (0.71)
Worse Cond. 0.0078 0.0536 0.0155 0.0511 0.0770
(0.39) (1.75) (0.66) (1.59) (1.30)
Tempe 0.0277 0.0080 0.0174 0.0482 0.0100
(0.61) (0.09) (0.52) (1.67) (0.32)
East Valley 0.0177 0.0758 0.0188 0.0112 0.0246
(0.62) (1.72) (0.73) (0.40) (0.98)
NWCities 0.0127 0.0373 0.0012 0.0105 0.0096
(0.32) (0.74) (0.04) (0.38) (0.32)
Scottsdale/CC 0.0230 0.0250 0.1003* 0.0415 0.0601*
(0.63) (0.53) (2.40) (0.72) (2.29)
Year 1999 0.0253 0.1266* 0.0704* 0.0812* 0.0467
(0.85) (3.30) (2.68) (2.73) (1.65)
Year 2000 0.0618* 0.0872* 0.0513* 0.0599* 0.0621*
(2.06) (2.11) (2.11) (2.02) (2.13)
Year 2001 0.0286 0.0036 0.0616* 0.0567 0.0476
(0.99) (0.08) (2.53) (1.82) (1.72)
Year 2002 0.0128 0.0483 0.0607* 0.0313 0.0196
(0.36) (1.10) (2.41) (1.10) (0.68)
Constant 0.1171 0.0407 0.1396* 0.1914* 0.0983*
(2.32) (0.72) (3.61) (4.67) (2.63)
Adj. R2 0.023 0.156 0.056 0.061 0.058
Note: No observations were listed as ‘‘better condition’’ for price levels 1 and 2. The omitted
variables include average condition, Central Phoenix, and 1998. Values in parentheses are t-Stats.
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3 and 5. Speciﬁcally, the assessment ratio increases with the number of apartment
units in price levels 1, 2 and 3. The ratio declines with building age (price level
1). In addition, the ratio is higher in the East Valley (price levels 2 and 5) and in
Scottsdale/Cave Creek (price levels 1 and 3) compared with Phoenix. The
volatility in the time variables is expected because assessed values are estimated
each year.
According to the results provided by the Allen and Dare (2002) model shown in
Panel B of Exhibit 10, the absolute value of inequity increased with the number
of apartment units (price levels 2 and 5) and building age (price level 5). However,
for Scottsdale/Cave Creek the absolute value of inequity increased in price level
3 but decreased in price level 5.
The building age variable is signiﬁcant in only one price level in each model
(price level 1 and 5). Also, East Valley was only signiﬁcant in the one model
(price level 2 panel A). Considering these relatively weak results, these variables
do not warrant further scrutiny; however, the results for number of units and
Scottsdale/Cave Creek variables do. The coefﬁcients for the number of units
variable are signiﬁcant and positive in multiple price levels in both models. Units
can be a proxy for property value; therefore, the results may be capturing evidence
of vertical equity as noted in the prior analysis, or the assessor may be having
difﬁculty maintaining stability in the assessment ratio for buildings of similar
value, but of different sizes. The Scottsdale/Cave Creek variable is more
interesting. Both of these communities are considered more afﬂuent compared
with other communities in Maricopa County. Panel A shows that in two of the
price levels (1 and 3); the assessment ratio is higher than in Phoenix. In addition,
the absolute value of inequity is increasing in price level 3 but decreasing in price
level 5. The results suggest that horizontal inequity exists geographically,
speciﬁcally that Scottsdale/Cave Creek apartments are being overassessed
compared with other apartments with similar values.
 Equity Across Assessment Methods
The Maricopa County assessor’s ofﬁce uses a hedonic sales comparison approach
to value apartments with less than thirteen units, but a hedonic income approach
to value all other apartment properties. This provides a unique opportunity to
examine equity across assessment methods. One direct method to examine equity
across assessment methods is to determine whether the mean AV/SP ratios
between the groups are equal. If the means are not statistically different, then the
appraisal of both types of properties is uniform. If the population variances of the
two groups are equal, then the pooled t-Test is appropriate; however, if the
variances of the underlying population are not assumed equal, but the populations
are normally distributed, the two-sample t-Test is appropriate.
The Tiao-Goldberger test for structural change in regression coefﬁcients also
provides a direct parametric examination of equity across assessment methods38  Cornia and Slade






1998 0.3789 0.7052 0.4669 0.6417
1999 0.7415 0.4593 0.7229 0.4724
2000 1.263 0.2084 1.224 0.2260
2001 2.903* 0.0041 3.082* 0.0026
2002 2.396* 0.0175 2.609* 0.0112
Aggregate 2.117* 0.0345 2.186* 0.0294
Note:
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
(Tiao and Goldberger, 1962).13 In this case, separate regressions using the same
functional form are generated on the two property groups, and then the Tiao-
Goldberger test determines whether structural stability of an individual coefﬁcient
exists between the two regressions. For example, assume that a model is speciﬁed
as follows: ln AV  ao  a1 ln SP. The coefﬁcient a1 provides the statistical
relationship between AV and SP. If the model were applied to two property groups,
then the relationship between AV and SP (the a1 coefﬁcient) would be similar if
equity exists across the groups. The Tiao-Goldberger test allows an explicit test
of coefﬁcient equality between regressions at a predetermined conﬁdence level.
The null hypothesis is that the coefﬁcients are statistically similar.
The Mann-Whitney test provides a nonparametric test for equity across assessment
methods (IAAO, 1978; and Gloudemans, 1999). The null hypothesis is that the
two types of multifamily housing are assessed at equal percentages of market
value. AV/SP ratios from the two groups are pooled and ranked from smallest to
largest; then the test determines at a speciﬁed conﬁdence level whether the ranks
assigned to the two property groups are approximately equal with respect to
averages. A z-value provides a direct test to determine whether the null hypothesis
should be rejected at a speciﬁed conﬁdence level. This test assumes that the ratios
from each group are normally distributed and have equal variance.
Another frequently used measure that provides insight into equity across two
groups, but is not a statistical test, is the Coefﬁcient of Dispersion (COD) (Mehta
and Giertz, 1996). The COD measures the degree of dispersion around the median
AV/SP ratio by calculating the average percentage deviation from the median.14
One negative aspect of the COD measure is a scale problem. For example, assume
a median AV/SP ratio for group A is 100, while the ratio for group B is 50. EvenProperty Taxation of Multifamily Housing  39
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Exhibit 12  Tiao-Goldberger Test for Structural Change
Variable






lnAV  ao  a1lnSP





lnSP  ao  a1lnAV





a0 0.9561 0.8089 2.3760 0.0342 4.3342 0.3197
(16.62) (47.34) (2.20) (0.27) (7.86) (1.11)
a1 3.81E-7 4.98E-10 0.7958 0.9832 0.6769 0.9973
(2.58)* 0.48 (2.41)* (1.89) (7.27)* (0.13)
1999 0.0637 0.0641 0.0755 0.0502 0.0269 0.1084
(1.70) (2.75) (1.32) (1.48) (0.83) (1.59)
2000 0.1432 0.0856 0.1961 0.0814 0.0421 0.1343
(3.76) (3.63) (3.37) (2.38) (1.29) (1.95)
2001 0.1990 0.0890 0.2829 0.0855 0.0800 0.1387
(5.68) (3.77) (5.29) (2.49) (2.62) (2.01)
2002 0.2413 0.1730 0.3505 0.2159 0.1437 0.0339
(6.30) (7.50) (5.98) (6.42) (4.43) (0.50)
Adj. R2 0.2284 0.0689 0.3587 0.9438 0.5381 0.7702
Tiao Statistic 5.195** 4.103** 29.93**
Notes: Values in parentheses are t-Stats. Number of observations for Comparable Approach 
217. Number of observations for Income Approach  729.
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
**Critical F0.05  3.84.
though the medians are very different for each group, the COD measure could be
the same for both, depending on the distribution of the AV/SP ratios about the
median. This scale problem complicates the interpretation of the COD measure
(Bowman and Mikesell, 1978).
Exhibit 11 provides the results from the means test. Both tests ﬁnd that the means
are statistically different in years 2001 and 2002 as well as overall (aggregate).
These results conﬁrm that there is inequity across the two groups, leading to the
supposition that as currently used one valuation method provides stronger results
compared with the other.
The Tiao-Goldberger test for structural change between regressions provides an
explicit test of equity across assessment methods but also provides for a
simultaneous examination of vertical equity. For this test, the sample of
transactions is divided between the two groups (small properties sales comparison
approach and large properties income approach) and the IAAO, Cheng and Clapp40  Cornia and Slade








*Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.





Inc. Appr. All Properties
1998 17.26 25.23 23.50
1999 18.34 16.91 17.26
2000 19.59 17.35 17.78
2001 21.36 19.23 20.54
2002 21.13 19.95 20.79
Aggregate 22.72 20.51 21.09
regression models are applied to the two groups.15 Binary time variables are
included to control for the intertemporal change in assessed values and sales price.
The coefﬁcient on the a1 variable measures vertical equity in the respective
samples. The Tiao-Goldberger test examines the structural stability of individual
coefﬁcients between regressions. Speciﬁcally, the null hypothesis is that the a1
coefﬁcients are equal between the two samples (large and small properties), testing
equity across assessment methods. Exhibit 12 illustrates the results of this analysis.
The a1 regression coefﬁcient on all models shows signiﬁcant regressive vertical
inequity for the small property sample. For the large properties, the a1 coefﬁcients
are not signiﬁcant, suggesting no vertical inequity. The Tiao-Goldberger statistic
is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level for each model, indicating that the a1 coefﬁcient is
not uniform or stable between the regressions of the two samples. Therefore,
inequity exists across the two assessment methods.
Exhibit 13 provides the results from the Mann-Whitney nonparametric test. The
null hypothesis assumes that large and small apartment complexes are appraisedProperty Taxation of Multifamily Housing  41
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at the same percentage of market value. The null is rejected at the 0.05 level for
years 2001 and 2002 as well as the aggregate. This result compares with the means
tests in Exhibit 11 and solidiﬁes the robustness of the results. The COD by year
and valuation method is provided in Exhibit 14. Although the COD measure is
not a direct statistical test of equity, it provides insight into the uniformity of the
AV/SP ratio intertemporally and between apartment groups. One obvious
observation from Exhibit 14 is that the reported COD is larger in the small
property sample in each year except 1998. This suggests less uniformity
intertemporally when the sales comparison approach is used for small properties
compared with the income approach that is used for large properties. Consistent
with the results found by the Tiao-Goldberger test, this ﬁnding provides added
support for the conclusion that inequity exists between the samples of small and
large properties, which are distinguished by different valuation methods.
 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This article has examined property tax uniformity in the multifamily housing
market in Phoenix, Arizona (Maricopa County). It differs from earlier studies
because it considers multiple years of data and examines both vertical and
horizontal equity issues as well as equity across assessment methods. It also uses
both parametric and nonparametric measures of uniformity and applies the Tiao-
Goldberger test to examine equity across assessment methods. The results offer
mixed evidence of vertical and horizontal inequity in multifamily housing in
Maricopa County from 1998 to 2002. With some models there is modest evidence
of vertical inequity in the early years of the study. However, extending the analysis
to account for the errors in variables problem raised by Clapp (1990), no
signiﬁcant vertical inequity is found in any of the individual years. In addition,
when all years are examined collectively, no signiﬁcant vertical inequity is found;
therefore, with respect to vertical inequity for the period 1998 to 2002, the
assessor’s outcomes are reasonable.
In the examination of horizontal equity within the various price levels, only limited
evidence of horizontal inequity is found. In the cases where horizontal inequity
is found, it is correlated with the number of units in a complex or geographic
location. The results suggest that apartment size and some geographic locations
are more difﬁcult for the assessor to value uniformly. The issues appear of a nature
that the assessor could make the needed adjustments to improve the outcome.
With respect to the concerns around assessment methods, the analysis reveals that
controlling for vertical equity using the sales comparison hedonic model is more
difﬁcult than using the income hedonic model. In addition, the parametric and
nonparametric tests indicate that there is inequity across the two assessment
methods.
In the context of the overall analysis, some limited policy conclusions are offered.
As noted in the introduction, the property tax enjoys very little ‘‘good press.’’ The42  Cornia and Slade
complaints may or may not be valid, but for apartment complexes within Maricopa
County there is little reason to complain about the uniformity of the property tax.
This is an important ﬁnding. Assessors are not immune to substantial external and
internal political pressure. Property tax assessors are elected ofﬁcials who often
have to manage their ofﬁces under signiﬁcant budget constraints, and as noted,
the challenge to value property accurately is substantial. The evidence suggests
that in spite of the external inﬂuences and the technical complexities of appraisal,
the assessor’s ofﬁce for the most part is meeting the challenge to value multifamily
property uniformly. This ﬁnding is especially noteworthy with respect to the issue
of vertical equity in multifamily housing. It is clear that large property owners
have greater resources to investigate property tax inequities and appeal property
taxes, and that they are more politically connected. This implies that assessing
ofﬁcers may thus be motivated to implement systems that mitigate negative
responses from large property owners; however, no signiﬁcant evidence of
differential treatment of properties over different price ranges was found. Naturally
this is just one study of a limited geographic area, but it offers hope for policy
makers concerned about the ability to achieve uniform property tax outcomes
within a single class of property.
 Endnotes
1 Allen (2003) notes that it is difﬁcult to generalize from his study. The limit on
generalizations from such studies is an underlying characteristic of any analysis of the
property tax and real estate market. The present study when coupled with the Allen
study, and anticipated other studies, may begin to help researchers and policy makers
understand the implications of the property tax on the multifamily housing market.
2 There is a long series of policies intended to promote the private ownership of housing,
away from rental housing (Segal and Sullivan, 1998).
3 CoStar Group, Inc. (formerly Comps InfoSytems, Inc.) investigates and compiles real
estate transaction data in many cities in the U.S., including Phoenix, Arizona. CoStar
veriﬁes the accuracy and legal nature of the reported sales. In doing so they do not
report non-arms length sales or sales of personal property. Summaries of the transactions
are provided to interested parties on a subscription basis. We thank Craig Farrington for
his generous assistance with the data.
4 Revaluation of property for property tax purposes on a cycle of every two years is an
aggressive and commendable schedule.
5 The use of hedonic models to estimate the value of multi-family housing is found in
Frew and Jud (2003).
6 Estimating property values based on rental income is a common practice in countries
with colonial ties to the British Empire. Referred to as the rating system, it is still used
in Hong Kong and Singapore. The tax base is the rental income, and the tax rates are
much higher than the tax rates on capital value (Bahl and Linn, 1995).
7 A similar approach has been reported for Stockholm, Sweden (Janssen and So ¨derberg,
2000).
8 If the assessment ratio is not uniform across properties, then the deliberate under
assessment makes it difﬁcult for property owners to seek relief, since an adjustment to
property tax is only allowed if the assessed value exceeds market value.Property Taxation of Multifamily Housing  43
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9 Both standards are based on examining the relationship between the assessed value (AV)
of a property and the market value of a property. Analysts generally substitute the sales
price (SP) of a property as a proxy for market value (Sirmans, Diskin and Friday, 1995).
10 Within the Paglin and Fogarty (1972) model, vertical equity in property taxation exists
if the intercept term a0 is zero; however, if the intercept is greater (less) than zero,
regressive (progressive) vertical tax inequity exists.
11 The cost approach is not used in Maricopa County to assess apartment buildings,
therefore, the Birch, Sunderman and Hamilton (1990) and Sunderman, Birch, Cannaday
and Hamilton (1990) models are not applicable in this analysis.
12 For large samples exceeding ﬁfty, the critical value for the Spearman Rank Test is
approximated as r   1.96/n  1. s
13 Tiao and Goldberger (1962) provides a test of individual parameter equality between
regressions. Some of the more recent applications of this test include Slade (2001),
Wolverton, Hardin and Cheng (1999), Allen, Springer and Waller (1995) and Michaels
and Smith (1990). The F-Statistic is as follows:
L 2 ˆ (b  b) ij i  P j1 ij TG F  L
SSR  j
j1
L L ˆ bij
(T  K )   jj P j1 j1 ij  , where b  , L (L  1) 1  P j1 ij
and where:
L is the number of models;
ji is the OLS estimates of the ith parameter in the jth independent model; ˆ b
Pij is the diagonal element for the ith parameter of (XX);
1
j
SSRj is the sum of squared residuals for the jth model;
Tj is the number of observations used to estimate the jth model; and
Kj is the number of parameters in the jth model.
This statistic is distributed as a central F distribution.
14 The COD is found using the following formula:
N 1 med R  R  i N i1
COD  x100, med R
where N is the number of properties, Ri is the assessed value-to-price ratio (A V/SP) for
property i and R
med is the median of these ratios.44  Cornia and Slade
15 Because of the functional form of the Bell (1984) model, a singularity problem occurs
in the calculation of the Tiao-Goldberger statistic; therefore, the Tiao-statistic is not
calculated for this model.
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